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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
OUTSIDE SALESMEN AND THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT *
By LEo M. ALPERT* *
Recently, the Court of Appeals had before it a novel
case.' The decision, however, in dismissing the appeal on
a technical point, did not expose the meat of the contro-
versy. Meat and marrow there is in plenty; to go behind
the dryly bare opinion is the purpose of this venture.
For doing that, apologetics may be in order.
The lawyer who discusses his case in the forum of
public opinion-in this instance the legal periodicals-
after losing it in the forum of last resort is properly sus-
pect. Even Mr. Justice Frankfurter, when teaching at
Harvard, was dubbed the Court of Last Resort of the
United States Supreme Court because of his ultimate judg-
ments, pronounced in classroom and law review, upon the
decisions of those whom he was eventually to join. Mr.
Justice Holmes is said never to have read law review notes
or comments because the "arrogance" of the writers irked
him. How much more difficult it becomes for the lawyer
in the case to explicate it without running afoul of arro-
gance or axe-grinding.
Yet the case at hand involves too important a point
under the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act and too
novel a query under the Federal Constitution for it to go
unnoticed. At the same time, it may be-it is hoped-that
this sort of venture will encourage other lawyers to discuss
their cases (with obvious benefit to their brothers) in spite
of inability in time and inclination to provide the scholarly
view now accepted as standard by the law reviews; which
have thus made it indecent for a lawyer to appear in public
without his footnotes.
* Acknowledgments are due Jacob Kartman, Esq., of the Baltimore Bar,
for many valuable discussions.
** Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1932, Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1935, Yale University.
1 Consolidated Home Equipment Corporation v. State Accident Fund and
Maryland Casualty Company, 13 A. (2d) 340 (Md. 1940).
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The pertinent facts of this case are that a New York
corporation was doing business in Maryland, Delaware,
and surrounding states. In Baltimore was the Branch
Office for the region. The corporation sold home equip-
ment and various household appliances through outside
salesmen, canvassers. For the more efficient conduct of
business in Delaware, the lower section of New Jersey,
the eastern section of Pennsylvania, and the upper sections
of Maryland, a sub-office was opened in Wilmington, Dela-
ware; that office being simply a stockroom and place of
convenience for the salesmen to get together and receive
instructions and merchandise from the manager who was
under the direction and control of the Baltimore Branch
Office, which kept the books, issued instructions on how the
business was to be done, prepared payrolls, etc. A citizen
and resident of Delaware was engaged, under a contract
made in Delaware, to solicit orders as an outside salesman
in a territory comprising Delaware, parts of Pennsylvania,
parts of New Jersey, and the Maryland region as far south
as Havre de Grace. The salesman had been working his
territory for some two years, regularly and frequently
spending a part of his time in Maryland (estimated as one-
fourth of his total hours), when he was injured in Mary-
land by an accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment. The Delaware Workmen's Compensation
Act specifically excluded application of the Act to injuries
occurring outside the state. 2 The employer carried insur-
ance in the State Accident Fund of Maryland covering
its liability under the Maryland Law. No premiums had
ever been paid the State Accident Fund for this particular
salesman-he had been mistakenly considered covered
under the Delaware Law by the employer-but the policy
issued by the State Accident Fund provided, in accordance
with law, that if any employee, whose remuneration had
been omitted from the payroll upon which the premiums
were based, was found subject to the Maryland Act, then
the payment of compensation was nonetheless assured de-
2 Del. Rev. Code (1935), Ch. 175, Sec. 6071.
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spite the omission, and the employer was to be liable to the
Fund for additional premiums for the omitted employee.
Quite apparently, if the Maryland Compensation Act
does not cover this injured employee, he falls straight
through an interstice in the supposedly seamless web of
the law. Equally important, so does his employer.
The Maryland Act covers:
"All salesmen including sales managers employed
to solicit orders from customers outside of the estab-
lishment for which they are employed, who are citi-
zens or residents of this State, employed by a person,
firm or corporation having a place of business within
this State, whether the injury for which compensation
is asked was sustained within this State or else-
where. . .. "I
The serious question under the Compensation Law is
whether an outside salesman, injured in Maryland, who is
otherwise covered under the Law (because working regu-
larly and frequently in Maryland, for a Maryland em-
ployer, in an extra-hazardous employment, injured by an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment) is deprived of such protection because he is not a
citizen or resident of Maryland.5 In language, the statute
seems to say so.
Said Judge McLanahan in his memorandum opinion in
the Baltimore City Court:
"Prior to 1924, 'outside salesmen' performing duties
such as the Claimant here performed, were not cov-
ered in any case whatsoever by the Maryland Work-
men's Compensation Act. By the Act of 1924, Chapter
583, the sub-section which appears as Sub-section 43 of
Section 32 of Article 101 of the Code, was added to the
law. The court is of the opinion, from the clear lan-
' The facts of the case are taken from the Record, pp. 6-9.
4 Md. Code (1939), Art. 101, Sec. 33, Subsec. 43.
5 The Court of Appeals agreed that this was the question. The opening
sentence of the opinion is: "At a first hearing of this case argument was
addressed to a question whether workmen's compensation insurance held
by the appellant under the Maryland State Accident Fund covered pay-
ment of compensation to one of its non-resident salesmen injured by an
accident within the State." Perhaps, put more broadly, the question
might be phrased whether this type of employment Is such as interests
Maryland. But, on reflection, the broad question liquesces into the




guage used in this section, that it was the intention of
the Legislature to extend the coverage of the Mary-
land Compensation Law, insofar as 'outside salesmen'
are concerned, merely to citizens or residents of this
State. The Court of Appeals, in the case of Liggett &
Meyers Tobacco Company vs. Goslin, 163 Md. 74, has
upheld the constitutionality of this provision.
6
Against that construction stand these considerations.
First, and fundamentally, every employee injured in
Maryland, who otherwise comes within the Workmen's
Compensation Act, is covered by the Act regardless of his
citizenship, residence, or place where the contract of em-
ployment was made. It is apparent, by way of example,
that a steelworker, who lives in Washington, D. C., where
he was hired, and who commutes to Baltimore every day
where he is regularly employed, injured in Baltimore, by
an accident arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment, cannot be denied compensation because he is not a
citizen or resident of Maryland, or because his contract of
employment was not made in Maryland. This is a rather
basic conception in our Compensation Act and cannot seri-
ously be disputed.7
Second, since our Act is meant to afford compensation
to every employee (regardless of citizenship, residence, or
8 Record, p. 12. Italics supplied. The opinion published in the Balti-
more Daily Record, June 12, 1939, is not accurate.
The Maryland Act is based upon the status of employer-employee in
Maryland, not upon contract between them. Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly
Co., 131 Md. 265, 101 A. 710 (1917) : see Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francks,
147 Md. 368, 128 A. 635, 44 A. L. R. 363 (1925). The Title to the Com-
pensation Act explicitly applies it to "workmen engaged in extra-hazardous
employments in this State" (italics supplied), and though the Title is not
a part of the body of the Act it can be accepted to make clear a legisla-
tive intent. Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francks, supra, 147 Md. 368, 373-
374. Section 14 of the Act in making the liability of the employer ex-
clusive, Section 65 in preventing employers and employees from contracting
away the benefits of the Act, and Section 80 (2) and (3) in defining "em-
ployer" and "employee", make the status relation even firmer. Taken
together with the Title and with Section 19 (which, in arranging for
classification of industries for premium purposes, reads in part: "the pay
of the employe partly within and partly without the State shall be
deemed to be such proportion of the total pay of such employe as his
services within the State bears to his services outside the State")-there is
exhibited the legislative intent that the Act reach workmen from other
states, injured in this state, who are regularly and frequently employed in
extra-hazardous work for a Maryland employer within this state. This
has been stated, in fact, in 6 Ops. Atty. Gen. 443 (1921). See also RESTATE-
MENT, CONFUCT oF LAWS, Sec. 399.
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place of contract) of a Maryland employer injured while
"engaged in extra-hazardous employments in this State",
a literal reading of the Outside Salesman Statute runs
counter to the basis of the legislation.
Third, it is unreasonable to say that the Legislature,
which never before was concerned with the citizenship or
residence or place of contract of employees otherwise fall-
ing under the Act, suddenly decided to impose such a quali-
fication upon outside salesmen injured in this state. It is
reasonable to say that the qualification applies only to
salesmen injured outside Maryland. The next point clari-
fies this.
Fourth, the purpose and history of the Outside Sales-
man Statute show that the "citizen or resident" clause was
directed not at the case of injuries within the state but at
an extra-territorial application of the Maryland Act. The
"citizen or resident" clause was not intended as a limitation
upon outside salesmen but as an extension of coverage to
them; i. e., even though injured beyond Maryland, outside
salesmen are covered by the Compensation Act provided
they are citizens or residents of Maryland working under
a contract made in Maryland; if injured within Maryland,
the extra-territorial extension of coverage-accomplished
through the "citizen or resident" clause-does not apply.'
This, too, is clarified by the next point.
Fifth, if coverage under the Workmen's Compensation
Act be denied to the non-resident in the case at hand, who
was injured in Maryland, a discrimination is made in favor
of citizens or residents without a proper basis. The "citi-
' The purpose of the statute is shown most clearly by the Original Bill:
"An Act to add a new paragraph to Section 32 of Article 101 . . .providing
that traveling salesmen, city salesmen and sales managers shall be in-
cluded within the provisions of said Article." Md. House Journal (1924)
193. Unfortunately, the Assembly debates are not recorded, and the news-
papers of the day do not seem to have paid much attention to the statute.
From the words "traveling salesmen", however, the inference is war-
ranted that the statute aimed at three things: first, at placing outside
salesmen within the extra-hazardous employment category; second, since
outside salesmen are known to be travelers, at an extra-territorial applica-
tion of the coverage; third, coverage extra-territorially only when the
citizen or resident condition was met. Whence, then, comes the require-
ment that in the case of injuries within Maryland the salesman must be
a citizen or resident? The requirement creeps In only through reading
the statute with an eye to language-words--not content,
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zen or resident" clause was necessary to achieve jurisdic-
tion extra-territorially, since in the case of employees in-
jured beyond Maryland this state would have no power
over them unless they were citizens or residents of Mary-
land working under a contract made in Maryland. But
equally with respect to citizens or residents injured beyond
Maryland as to non-citizens or non-residents injured in
Maryland, this state has jurisdiction. Therefore to argue
that because the Legislature imposed the "citizen or resi-
dent" condition in order to achieve extra-territoriality, the
condition applies where no extra-territoriality is involved
-as in the case at hand-is not only to invert the statute
and obfuscate the salutary effect sought, but also to cast
doubt upon its constitutionality-for the statute as thus
applied discriminates needlessly between residents and
non-residents.
These five points were treated in Appellant's Brief and
argued to the court. The State Accident Fund took the
position that the Legislature had the power to limit the
classes of persons entitled to the benefit of the Compensa-
tion Act9 and so could exclude non-resident outside sales-
men; that the decision in Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Com-
pany v. Goslin ° covered the case at bar; that the decision
there also settled the constitutional questions.
The Court of Appeals, seeking full enlightenment,
ordered a reargument. These were the queries of the
Court:
"1. Is the right to compensation given a citizen
or resident salesman for injury occurring within the
state, a privilege or immunity secured to a salesman
citizen of another state by Art. IV, sec. 2, of the United
States Constitution?
"2. If it is, what is the effect of that protection in
the present case? On this consider the opinion in
Quong Ham Wah v. Industrial Accident Commission,
9 Citing Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, 163 Md. 74, 160 A. 804
(1932); Middleton v. Texas Co., 249 U. S. 152, 39 S. Ct. 227, 63 L. Ed. 527
(1919); SCHNEIDER, WoRkMEN's COMPENSATION, Sec. 118; RESTATEMENT,
CoNFLicT OF LAWS, 485, et seq.
20 163 Md. 74, 160 A. 804 (1932).
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184 Cal. 26, 12 A. L. R. 1190, certiorari denied,11 255
U. S. 445, in connection with any other relevant cases
counsel may find.
"3. Is it a privilege or immunity protected under
the 14th Amendment? If so, what effect has that
amendment on the present case?
"4. Has the requirement of equal protection of the
laws in the 14th Amendment any effect on the present
case? If so, what?"
At reargument, submitted on briefs, the State Acci-
dent Fund raised the point that because it was the em-
ployer who appealed-not the employee-the appeal ought
to be dismissed. This the Court chose to do; saying rather
questionably: "The employee is the only one adversely
affected; but the employer cannot appeal for him."' 2
With this, the case at hand is presented. The two
meaty issues raised by it are the question of coverage
under the Compensation Act and the constitutional
queries.
I
The Goslin case" was the first decision on the Outside
Salesman Statute. A citizen and resident of Maryland
contracted, in Delaware, to work for a New York corpora-
tion in the territory of Delaware and Maryland. He was
injured in Delaware and compensation was denied under
the Maryland Act.
The effect of the statute, observed Judge Offutt speak-
ing for the Court, is to say to an employee: "If you live
"I Certiorari was not denied, but granted, an opinion was written, and
the cause was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.12 13 A. (2d) 340, 341 (Md. 1940). This seems rather questionable be-
cause the employer is as affected by the decision as the employee; work-
men's compensation acts also protect employers. There is a respectable
school of thought maintaining that employers, hard hit by juries, sought
compensation acts to make definite their exposure before juries to an
almost unlimited liability. In addition, Md. Code (1939) Art. 101, Sec.
70, permits any "employer, employe, beneficiary or person feeling aggrieved
by any decision of the Commission affecting his interests under this
Article" to appeal therefrom. Said Stockbridge, J., in Brenner v. Brenner,
127 Md. 189 (1915) : "The persons concerned, and with whom the Act had
primarily to do, were the employer and employee ... ."
18 The only other case on the statute is Boteler v. Gardiner-Buick Co.,
164 Md. 478, 165 A. 611 (1933).
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in this state or are a citizen thereof, and are employed
under a contract made in this state by an employer doing
business therein, and in the course of your employment
you are injured beyond the state, you are entitled to com-
pensation, but if you do not live in this state or are not
a citizen thereof, then under like conditions you are not
entitled to compensation under this act."' 4
The Court, to put it shortly, read into the Statute a
requirement that the contract of employment be made in
Maryland. Such a construction was necessary, Judge
Offutt explained, because otherwise "an employer in any
other state who kept a place of business of any kind in
this state could be subjected to the provisions of the act
even though the contract of employment was not made
in this state, the employment was not to be performed
in this state, and the accident did not occur therein."'1
Concretely, for example, a British corporation doing busi-
ness in Maryland and all over the world, employing in
London a Maryland citizen to work in India, who was
injured in India, might be subject to the Maryland Act
unless there is a requirement that the contract of employ-
ment be made in Maryland. This possibility, well elab-
orated in Appellant's Brief in the Goslin case, found agree-
ment with the Court. "No such illogical and impossible
purpose could have been intended," runs the opinion, "first,
because the State would have been powerless to enforce
any such provisions, and, again, because such a result is
foreign to the manifest purpose and spirit of the legisla-
tion.""6
To this there can be no cavil. It is general and sound
law aptly put by the Restatement of Conflicts of Laws:
"No recovery can be had under the Workmen's
Compensation Act of a state if neither the harm oc-
curred nor the contract of employment was made in
the state."'17






The Goslin case was advanced by the State Accident
Fund in the case at hand as foreclosing any question of the
meaning and application of the Outside Salesman Statute.
It was argued that under the Goslin decision the contract
of employment must be made in Maryland. This conten-
tion, it is suggested, entirely missed the reality that the
Goslin case dealt with one side of an octagonal problem.
The importance of this discussion to a sound development
of our law on workmen's compensation lies in recognizing
the Goslin case as one, and the case at hand as another
facet of eight different situations. In each, the legally
operative facts require separate reasoning. A mechanical
compression of the various situations leads to disaster.
1. The outside salesman is a resident of Maryland, in-
jured in Maryland, while working under a contract made
in Maryland. Here is the plain instance of coverage. The
salesman meets, without question, the conditions of the
Statute and of the Goslin case.
2. The salesman is a non-resident, injured beyond
Maryland, working under a contract made outside of Mary-
land. Here, again conclusion and reason are simple; the
salesman is not entitled to compensation.
3. The salesman is a resident, injured beyond Mary-
land, working under a contract made in Maryland. This
presents the situation that the Statute, relying just on bare
language, was aimed at; and the consilience from the opin-
ion in the Goslin case is that compensation must be granted.
"4. The salesman is a resident, injured beyond Mary-
land, working under a contract made outside Maryland.
These are the operative facts of the Goslin case; the sales-
man is not to receive compensation.
5. The salesman is a resident, injured in Maryland,
working under a contract made outside Maryland. The
conclusion, it is suggested, should be that the salesman is
entitled to compensation. The Statute itself has no locus
contractus requirement; the Goslin decision made neces-
sary a Maryland contract only because otherwise the Mary-
land courts would have no jurisdiction and would be coy-
[VOT,. V
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ering salesmen all over the world who simply happened
to be Maryland residents. In this fifth situation, however,
it is easy to see that neither of those reasons have force.
Moreover, the basic policy of the Compensation Act is
that employees injured in this state should be covered; and,
as previously opined, the "citizen or resident" requirement
was imposed in order to achieve extra-territoriality; and
where no extra-territoriality is involved-as in the situa-
tion where the injury occurs in Maryland-the require-
ment should not apply.'8
6. The salesman is a non-resident, injured in Maryland,
working under a contract made in Maryland. Compensa-
tion should be granted, it is submitted, for the same rea-
sons.
7. The salesman is a non-resident, injured in Maryland,
working under a contract made outside Maryland. These
are the facts of the case at hand. The two preceding factual
set-ups and the reasons there controlling should direct the
conclusion. The salesman ought to receive compensation.
8. The salesman is a non-resident, injured beyond
Maryland, working under a Maryland contract. The Stat-
ute and the Goslin case, read together, require, in the case
of an extra-territorial injury, that the salesman be a resi-
dent working under a Maryland contract. Here both con-
ditions are not satisfied; the salesman is a non-resident.
Hence he is not entitled to compensation.
This excursion into the possibilities"' may not sit well
with hard-headed lawyers who need the authority of
adjudicated cases to be convinced of anything. But on
what thread other than such reasoning can these eight
situations be strung? An attempt to apply the test of
where the contract of employment was made, using the
11 Supra circa n. 7.
"a There may be the possibility of a fourth variable in the situations
which give rise to the eight different setups, namely, whether all or merely
part of the man's employment is in a single state. Thus, in situations 2, 4
and 5, of what effect would be the fact that the employee's main or pre-
dominant work was in Maryland? Certainly that fact tugs hard at the
equities in those situations. This factor is not considered by the text of
this article because there is up to the present no recognition of it in the
Maryland cases. Quaere as to the effect of Md. Code (1939) Art. 101,
Sec. 80, Par. (3), last sentence.
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Goslin case as authority, breaks down quickly. The touch-
stone that works is that where the injury occurs beyond
Maryland the salesman must be a citizen or resident em-
ployed under a contract made in Maryland; where the
injury occurs in Maryland, residence and place of contract
are immaterial.
In addition to the logic behind this touchstone and to
the pragmatic use of it, any other construction contra-
venes the privileges and immunities clause in the Federal
Constitution.
II
In the Goslin case the employier, on appeal, argued that
if the salesman there were to be covered under the Mary-
land Act just because he was a citizen or resident of Mary-
land, then the interstate privileges clause of the Constitu-
tion (the Comity Clause) would be violated since citizens
of each state would not then be receiving the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states.
The Court disposed of the argument by holding that the
Outside Salesman Statute took away no privileges but
rather extended privileges'-the benefits of the Work-
men's Compensation Act-to all persons over whom the
state had jurisdition: citizens or residents of Maryland.
Hence there was no discrimination against non-residents.
"Since the act could have no extra-territorial effect,
the State could not have extended it so as to include
persons who were neither citizens or residents of the
State, for over such persons it would have had no
jurisdiction." 20
Because this state has jurisdiction over non-residents
injured within Maryland, however, the question is whether
the Statute (unless construed as previously suggested
herein) discriminates in favor of citizens or residents of
19 Note that this supports the view taken, supra circa n. 8, that the
citizen or resident clause was not Intended as a limitation on outside
salesmen but as an extension of coverage to them.
20 163 Md. 74, 80, 160 A. 804 (1932).
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Maryland without a proper basis;2 for with respect to
citizens or residents, as with respect to non-residents in-
jured in Maryland, the state has jurisdiction.
Thus the questions are precisely those four which the
Court of Appeals wanted aired.
Is the Right to Compensation Given a Citizen or Resident
Salesman for Injury Occurring within the State a
Privilege or Immunity secured to a Salesman
Citizen of Another State by Article IV, Section
2, of the United States Constitution?
Says the Privileges and Immunities Clause: "The Citi-
zens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
These privileges and immunities are far different from
those of the "citizens of the United States" which a state,
by the Fourteenth Amendment, is forbidden to abridge.
The phrase "privileges and immunities" is the same in both
Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment but the partic-
ular privileges and immunities intended are radically dif-
ferent. "In the one case it is the privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several states; in the other, the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States."2
This important distinction, as will appear later, points
the privileges and immunities in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as those arising out of the nature and essential char-
acter of the Federal Government, not of state govern-
ments.23 It is, of course, the privileges and immunities of
Article IV that are the concern here.
Of the Interstate Privileges Clause, Hamilton wrote:
"It may be esteemed the basis of the Union. '24 Its purpose
was to make the citizens of the United States one people.
The language was taken from the Articles of Confederation
21 A non-resident is not entitled to every privilege of a resident; dis-
criminations founded upon a reasonable basis are unobjectionable. See
Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 64 L. Ed. 713, 40 S. Ct.
402 (1920). This will be discussed further herein.
21 Meyers, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several
States (1903) 1 Mich. L. Rev. 286, 286.
"1 This will be discussed further herein.
2' The Federalist, No. 80.
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and was intended, in the words of those Articles, the better
"to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and inter-
course among the people of the different States in this
Union."25
One of the earliest cases construing the clause, a Mary-
land decision, indicated that it was the personal rights
of citizens-not their public rights-which came within
the privileges and immunities protection. 6 Robert Morris
of Pennsylvania owned lands in Maryland which were
seized under our non-resident attachment statute. In dis-
missing Morris' plea that his privileges and immunities had
been violated, Judge Chase said:
"The Court are of opinion it means that the citizens
of all the States shall have the peculiar advantage of
acquiring and holding real as well as personal prop-
erty, and that such property shall be protected and
secured by the laws of the State, in the same manner
as the property of the citizens of the Stite is protected.
It means, such property shall not be liable to any taxes
or burdens which the property of citizens is not subject
to. It may also mean that as creditors, they shall be
on the same footing with the State creditor, in pay-
ment of the debts of a deceased debtor. It secures and
protects personal rights.'27
The first federal case, and therefore a very famous one,
was Corfield v. Coryell.2s Circuit Justice Bushrod Washing-
ton, upholding a New Jersey statute which forbade non-
residents to gather oysters on any boat not wholly owned
by a resident-the basis for the decision being that the
privileges and immunities clause did not include the right
to enjoy public property, fisheries, held in common for the
benefit of the people of the state-unflinchingly enumer-
ated a number of privileges and immunities.
"We feel no hesitation in confining these expres-
sions to those privileges and immunities which are,
in their nature, fundamental .... What these funda-
25 Art. IV, Articles of Confederation.
2a Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797).
"7 Id., 554. Italics supplied.
2s Fed. Case 3230, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (1823).
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mental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedi-
ous than difficult to enumerate. They may, however,
be all comprehended under the following general
heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain hap-
piness and safety; subject nevertheless to such re-
straints as the government may justly prescribe for
the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen
of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other
state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional
pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ
of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of
any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an
exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are
paid by the other citizens of the state. . . These, and
many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly
speaking, privileges and immunities ... "I"
Another of the early cases held unconstitutional a Mary-
land statute which taxed residents operating under a trad-
er's license from $150 down, depending upon the value of
their stock, but imposed a flat fee of $300 on non-residents.
Mr. Justice Clifford, aware of the enormity of enumerating
privileges and immunities, shied the task:
"Attempt will not be made to define the words
'privileges and immunities', or to specify the rights
which they are intended to secure and protect, beyond
what may be necessary to the decision of the case
before the court. Beyond doubt those words are words
of very comprehensive meaning, but it will be suffi-
cient to say that the clause plainly and unmistakeably
secures and protects the right of a citizen of one State
to pass into any other State of the Union for the pur-
pose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or busi-
ness without molestation; to acquire personal property;
to take and hold real estate; to maintain actions in the
courts of the State; and to be exempt from any higher
taxes or excises than are imposed by the State upon
its own citizens."30
' Id., 551-552.
10 Ward v. Maryland, 79 U. S. 418, 430, 20 L. Ed. 449 (1870).
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In the same year the famed Slaughterhouse cases
evoked this explanation of the Interstate Privileges Clause:
"The description, when taken to include others not
named, but which are of the same general character,
embraces nearly every civil right for the establish-
ment and protection of which organized government
is instituted. They are, in the language of Judge
Washington, those rights which are fundamental." 1
Blake v. McClung used the accumulated reason of the
decisions. A Tennessee statute provided that, on the dis-
tribution of the assets of an insolvent foreign corporation
doing business within the state, residents were to be pre-
ferred over non-residents. The statute was held violative
of the privileges and immunities clause; Mr. Justice Harlan,
after a review of the cases, saying:
"The foundation upon which the above cases rest
cannot however stand, if it be adjudged to be in the
power of one State, when establishing regulations for
the conduct of private business of a particular kind,
to give its own citizens essential privileges connected
with that business which it denies to citizens of other
States. By the statute in question the British company
was to be deemed and taken to be a corporation of
Tennessee, with authority to carry on its business in
that State. It was the right of citizens of Tennessee
to deal with it. . . .And it was equally the right of
citizens of other States to deal with that corporation.
"No one would question the right of the individual
plaintiffs in error, although not residents of Tennessee,
to sell their goods to that corporation upon such terms
in respect of payment as might be agreed upon, and
to ship them to the corporation at its place of business
in that State. But the enjoyment of these rights is
materially obstructed by the statute in question; for
that statute, by its necessary operation, excludes citi-
zens of other States from transacting business with
that corporation upon terms of equality with citizens
of Tennessee. By force of the statute alone, citizens
of other States, if they contracted at all with the Brit-
" Slaughterhouse eases. 83 U. S. 36. 76 (1873).
[VOL. V
OUTSIDE SALESMEN
ish corporation, must have done so subject to the
onerous condition that if the corporation became in-
solvent its assets in Tennessee should first be applied
to meet its obligations to residents of that State ...
But, clearly, the State could not in that mode secure
exclusive privileges to its own citizens in matters of
business. If a State should attempt ... to give prior-
ity to the claims of such individual creditors as were
citizens of that State over the claims of individual cred-
itors, citizens of other States, such legislation would
be repugnant to the Constitution upon the ground that
it withheld from citizens of other States as such, and
because they were such, privileges granted to citizens
of the State enacting it. ' '32
The two latest expressions of opinion from the Supreme
Court" repeat, with elaborations, the reasoning of these
cases and crack to pieces the older view that a citizen of
one state has fundamental privileges and immunities in-
hering in him by mere virtue of his citizenship. It is not
that a citizen of one state has fundamental rights under
the privileges and immunities clause which he carries about
his person. It is rather, as Dean Howell observed in his
brochure on the subject, written some twenty-two years
ago and still sound today, that "in any given State, every
citizen of every other State shall have the same privileges
and immunities which the citizens of that State possess.
,)34
From this review it may be suggested that the privileges
and immunities in Article IV relate to those substantial
substantive legal relations between a citizen and the states,
which, taken together, constitute the people of the United
States one nation; since, no matter where in the length
and breadth of this country a citizen travel or take up
residence, he is assured of protection by the government,
access to the courts, the enjoyment of his liberty, the pos-
session of his property, and the opportunity to engage, on
32 172 U. S. 239, 252-3, 43 L. Ed. 432, 19 S. Ct. 165 (1898).
"Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 511, 83 L. Ed. 1423, 59 S. Ct. 954
(1939) ; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 90, 84 L. Ed. 590, 60 S. Ct. 406
(1940).




terms of equality with his fellows who are not in a favored
class, in trade, agriculture, business and professional pur.
suits. With these, his rights to marry, to control the
descent of the property which he may acquire, to guide his
children and his family on equal terms with the citizens of
the state to which he moves-it may be in order the better
to follow his fortunes-are the basic privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the several states. 5
Rather glittering generalities with a touch of poesy de-
scribes that formulation of the privileges and immunities;
for in almost any particular case there may indeed remain
a question whether the legal relation is one of those basic
private rights. In the case at hand, however, it would
seem that the relation is clearly within the Comity Clause.
The protection afforded by workmen's compensation
acts is today an integral part of the pursuit of a trade.
Whether workmen's compensation, from a technical legal
view, is a statutory substitute for the common law master-
servant relation, it certainly is from a practical one. As
such, it should be considered a privilege and immunity of
the citizens of a state. The Quong Ham Wah case so held. 6
There the employer had hired, in California, one Owe
Ming under an agreement that the employee was to work
in Alaska. Owe Ming, injured in Alaska, on his return
petitioned for compensation in California. The California
statute, aiming at the same thing as the Maryland statute
but more clearly, read:
"The commission shall have jurisdiction over all
controversies arising out of injuries suffered without
the territorial limits of this state in those cases where
the injured employee is a resident of this state at the
time of the injury and the contract of hire was made
in this state, and any such employee or his dependents
shall be entitled to the compensation or death benefits
provided by this Act. '8 7
' See BLAcx, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd Ed. 1910) 640; WILLOUGHBY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2nd Ed. 1929) Sec. 137.
"Quong Ham Wah v. Industrial Accident Commission, 184 Calif. 26,
192 Pac. 1021; 12 A. L. R. 1190 (1920), dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
255 U. S. 445, 65 L. Ed. 723, 41 S. Ct. 373 (1921).
"1 Calif. Laws of 1917, Ch. 586, Sec. 58. Now, altered somewnat In word-




"When, however, the legislature attempts to pro-
vide that a substantial privilege shall be incident to
certain contracts of employment when entered into in
this state by citizens of this state and that that privilege
shall not be incident to identical contracts of employ-
ment when entered into in this state by citizens of
other states of our Union, the enactment is clearly in
contravention of section 2 of Article IV of the federal
constitution. . . It is true that many procedural
discriminations between citizens and non-citizens have
been upheld, but the rule applied in such situations
has no application where a substantial substantive
right is granted to citizens and under like circum-
stances is denied to citizens of other states. The stat-
ute here in question provides for the creation within
this state of a right to accident insurance as an incident
to certain contracts of employment in favor of citizens
and opens the door of its courts and commissions to
citizens to enable them to enforce that right. This
right is not accorded to citizens of other states. A
privilege and protection of the laws of a substantial
nature is thereby accorded to citizens of this state and
denied to citizens of other states. This is forbidden by
the federal constitution."38
In answer to the contention that the discrimination was
reasonable because the statute was to prevent citizens of
the state and their families from becoming burdens, the
court observed that this was a very excellent reason for
requiring compensation for citizens but was no reason at
all for denying the same right to citizens of other states:
"The fact that considerations of public policy do not affirm-
atively require the extension of the benefits in question to
citizens of sister states as strongly as they require their ex-
tension to citizens of this state furnishes absolutely no
sound reason for the exclusion of the former and affords
no reasonable basis for the discrimination. ' 89
There may be a question on the soundness of this hold-
ing that there was no reasonable ground for the discrim-




ination between residents and non-residents-certainly,
however, the decision that the right to workmen's compen-
sation fell within the Interstate Privileges Clause is proper.
An annotator is critical of the case, though explaining that
there is little direct authority on the point of whether the
discrimination is reasonable or not.41 Our Court of Appeals
in the Goslin case stated it was unable to accept the rea-
soning on the discrimination issue.41 The Goslin holding,
however, did not touch on the question of whether the
right to workmen's compensation was an interstate privi-
lege. A litigation on all fours with the operative facts of
the Goslin case reached the conclusion of that case but did
so by relying on the privileges and immunities clause, by
placing workmen's compensation within the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states.
There, the employer, an Indiana corporation, also did
business in Oklahoma and Arkansas. The employee, a
resident of Indiana, contracted in Arkansas to work there
for the corporation and was killed there. Claim by the
employee's dependents under the Indiana law was refused.
"To give a controlling influence to the fact that the em-
ployee was a resident of this state," said the Court, "tempo-
rarily living in another state, so as to allow compensation
in this case, when compensation would have to be denied
if such employee had been a resident of Illinois, would
be granting rights and privileges to a citizen of this state
40 12 A. L. R. 1207. The annotator cites Western Metal Supply Co. v.
Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 Pac. 491, L. R. A. 1917-E 390 (1916), a case
which held the compensation act not unconstitutional because it required
payments to non-resident dependents of a deceased employee. The opinion
read in part: "If it may reasonably be thought that the best interests
of the state, of the employers of labor, and of those employed, as well as
of the public generally, are promoted by imposing upon the industry or
the public the burden of industrial accidents-and some such theory lies
at the bottom of all workmen's compensation statutes . . . the residence
and citizenship of the injured workman, or (if he shall have met death)
of his dependents, are factors entirely foreign to the discussion. The
legislature has determined that the employment of labor in given pursuits
entails upon the employer certain responsibilities toward the persons per-
forming the labor and those dependent upon them. There is no constitu-
tional or rational ground for limiting the benefits of this legislative scheme
to citizens or residents of this state. If the employment was such as to
fall within the state's lawmaking jurisdiction, the legislature certainly had
the power to pass laws operating uniformly upon all persons affected by
such employment."41 163 Md. 74, S1, 160 A. 804 (1932).
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which would not, under the same facts, be granted citizens
of other states. Suppose that when Cubbison [the em-
ployee] was employed to go to Arkansas and work for
appellant, another person residing in Illinois had also been
employed under like circumstances; that both men went
to Arkansas and both were injured in the same accident;
would not a law granting compensation to Cubbison and
denying it to the other be in conflict with the provisions
of the Constitution of the United States which prohibits the
granting of rights and privileges to citizens of one state
that, under like circumstances, are not granted to citizens
of other states? 42
These cases hold the right to compensation a privilege
under Article IV-the disagreement centers only around
the question of whether there is a reasonable basis for the
discrimination between residents and non-residents. The
disagreement is of no concern here. It is the establishment
of the privilege that is the question here-not the further
question of extension of the privilege."
So in the case at hand the fact that non-residents in-
jured in Maryland are covered by the Compensation Act;
that-assuming the Outside Salesman Statute to be meant
to apply literally as it reads-only outside salesmen, of
the many types of employees covered by the Act must be
citizens or residents in order to receive compensation; that
an outside salesman who is a citizen or resident of Mary-
land, working under a contract made outside Maryland,
injured in Maryland, is given the benefit of the Act and
the same salesman under the same circumstances is denied
benefits if he is not a citizen or resident; these facts seem
to establish, whether the question of discrimination in
the Quong Ham Wah case be considered sound or unsound,
the withholding of a privilege from non-residents as such,
12 Bement Oil Corp. v. Cubbison, 84 Ind. App. 22, 25, 149 N. E. 919 (1925).
43 These cases deal with aspects of the problem: Gregutis v. Waclark
Wire Works Co., 86 N. J. L. 610, 92 A. 354 (1914) ; Vietti v. Fuel Co., 109
Kan. 179, 197 P. 881 (1921); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Chamos, 203 Ky.
820, 263 S. W. 370 (1924). For apt analogies in other fields see Conner v.
Elliott, 18 How. 591, 15 L. Ed. 497 (1856); Chemung Canal Bank v.
Lowery, 93 U. S. 72, 23 L. Ed. 806 (1876) ; Chambers v. B. & 0. R. Co.,
207 U. S. 142, 52 L. Ed. 143, 28 S. Ct. 34 (1907).
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and because they are such, that is given to residents and
even to non-residents who are not engaged as outside
salesmen.
If that be so, does the Outside Salesman Statute be-
come void for conflicting with the privilege and immunities
clause?
What Is the Effect of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in the Present Case?
The Quong Ham Wah case took the position that al-
though there was a discrimination between residents and
non-residents violative of the privileges and immunities
clause, the effect of that clause was not to render the
compensation statute void but to allow it to stand "and
automatically, and without regard to the intent of the state
legislature"" to extend the benefits to such non-residents
as are citizens of sister states.
The reasoning, based upon an earlier California case
dealing with estate taxes,4 5 went along the line that the
privileges and immunities clause is not prohibitory, penal,
or restrictive in language; that the clause does not forbid
certain state legislation but rather assures the citizens of
each state of the privileges and immunities a state declares
for its own citizens; that the clause, therefore, ex proprio
vigore, becomes an express part of every state statute; that,
in consequence, the courts do not strike down a statute
which does not give equal privileges but instead extend the
statute so as to place all citizens upon an equal footing.
"Viewed in this light," said the Court, "it is clear that
when a state statute imposes a burden on a non-citizen
which is not imposed on the citizen of the state, the non-
citizen may have relief from the burden thus imposed by
invoking the provision of the federal constitution for the
nullification of the discriminatory legislation. But, when
a privilege is granted to a citizen and withheld from a non-
citizen, the latter finds relief in the provision of the federal
4 184 Calif. 26, 39, 192 Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190 (1920).
5 Estate of Johnson, 139 Calif. 532, 73 Pac. 424, 96 Am. St. Rep. 161(1903).
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constitution which, by operation of law, so to speak, ex-
tends the privilege to him."4"
This doctrine, which seems so novel, which seems to
presage some unusual wrinkle in constitutional construc-
tion, has support in the decisions.
On certiorari, the Quong Ham Wah case was dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court stating that
it was without authority to review and revise the con-
struction of a state statute by the court of last resort of
that state. Chief Justice White wrote:
"True it is elaborately argued that the court below
erred in supposing that the statute was susceptible of
the construction which it affixed to it and that, instead
of adopting that construction, its duty was to hold the
statute void for repugnancy to the Constitution on the
grounds which were urged. But this in a different
form of statement but disputes the correctness of the
construction affixed by the court below to that state
statute and assumes that the construction is here sus-
ceptible of being disregarded upon the theory of the
existence of the discrimination contended for when,
if the meaning affixed to the statute by the court below
be accepted, every basis for such contended discrim-
ination disappears. It follows that the argument but
accentuates the frivolous character of the federal ques-
tion relied on."47
That the Supreme Court thus permitted this unique view
of the privileges and immunities clause to pass-and in so
doing gave notice to the state courts of last resort that they
might follow suit-is not especially astonishing after the
language in Blake v. McClung and the Slaughterhouse
cases is considered. In the former case, though the Tennes-
see statute (which preferred residents over non-residents
on the distribution of the assets of an insolvent foreign
corporation) was held repugnant to the Constitution, it
was not held void; the privileges and immunities clause
was read into the statute, ex proprio vigore, and the in-
equality levelled. In the latter, the Supreme Court first
11 184 Calif. 26, 41, 192 Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190 (1920).
' 255 U. S. 445, 449, 65 L. Ed. 729, 41 S. Ct. 381 (1921).
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enunciated the doctrine that the Comity Clause did not
profess to control the action of state governments but in-
stead declared that whatever rights the state granted to
its own citizens neither more nor less was to be the measure
of the rights of citizens of other states within the juris-
diction.
"The constitutional provision [in Article IV]
did not create those rights which it called privileges
and immunities of citizens of the States. It threw
around them in that clause no security for the citizens
of the State in which they were claimed or exercised.
Nor did it profess to control the power of the State
governments over the rights of its own citizens."
"Its sole purpose was to declare to the several
States, that whatever those rights, as you grant or
establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit
or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise,
the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure
of the rights of citizens of other States within your
jurisdiction."48
These cases seem the only direct authority on the point.
From the holdings of other cases, however, it follows that
in effect the courts do extend privileges and immunities
to citizens of other states when they strike down limita-
tions. 9 And one case has woven a variation of the doc-
trine: that the privileges and immunities are to be ex-
tended, ex proprio vigore, save where the legislature has
expressly limited the statute to residents-it must be an
express limitation not just a statement of application-in
which event the statute must be voided.50
That case brought up a war-time statute providing
exemptions for Wisconsin residents in military service
from all civil process and proceedings until their discharge
from service. A Wisconsin resident in military service
pleaded the statute as defense to a civil bastardy action.
Judge Rosenberry, speaking for the Court, adjudged the
's83 U. S. 36, 77, 21 L. Ed. 3.94 (1873).
See the Quong Ham WI( case, 184 Calif. 26, 40 et 8eq., 192 Pac. 1021,
12 A. L. R. 1190 (1920).50 Konkel v. State, 168 Wis. 335. 170 N. W. 715 (1919).
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statute void for conflicting with the federal soldiers' and
sailors' relief acts, but, in the course of his opinion, said:
"The privilege of the act not being denied to the
citizens of other states by the express terms of the
act, it must be held to apply to the citizens of other
states of the Union. The citizens of other states are
entitled under the federal constitution to enjoy the
same privileges and immunities as are conferred upon
citizens of this state. Therefore, all the privileges and
immunities conferred by the act upon the citizens of
this state are conferred upon the citizens of other
states, in the absence of language expressly limiting
the act to citizens of this state. Blake v. McClung, 172
U. S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. 165; Estate of Johnson, 139 Cal.
532, 538, 73 Pac. 424; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall.
36, 77.151
In addition to the force of these decisions, there may be
added the logical consequences of considering privileges
and immunities, not as fundamental attributes of state citi-
zenship, but as a set of private rights based on the exten-
sion to citizens of one state who may be in another, the
rights granted by the latter state to its own citizens. Says
Dean Howell in making this distinction clear (a distinction
now settled law, as has already been remarked herein):
"It is evident that there is nothing in common be-
tween this idea of a number of defined rights which
are absolutely secured to citizens of each State in every
other State, and the idea that the most the citizens of
one State can claim in another is the same treatment
as that State affords its own citizens, except with re-
gard to the exercise of public rights, and in so far as
the safety and the welfare of the citizens of the State
demand police legislation to the contrary. ' '5 la
The consequence is plain: ". . . if these rights are con-
ceived of as fundamental, they are absolutely guaranteed,
while according to the correct view, they are secured only
,1 Id. 168 Wisc. 335, 338.




in so far as they are granted by each State to its own citi-
zens.
'51b
Hence the conclusion that our Outside Salesman Statute
need not be held void for impairing a guaranteed right,
but is rather to be held to be an attempted limitation which
the constitution itself extends.
The Effect of the Interstate Privileges Clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment.
It has already been observed that this clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment refers only to those privileges and
immunities which arise out of the nature and essential
character of the federal government. 52  The text-writers
and cases agree.58
In 1935, however, Colgate v. Harvey54 attempted to
expand the privileges and immunities of national citizen-
ship by including thereunder the right to buy, sell, contract
and negotiate-legal relations which had previously been
regarded as attributes of state citizenship only. The ex-
pansion, concretely, held that since Vermont assessed a
5% tax on income from money loaned outside the state
and placed no tax on income derived from a loan within
the state, there was a discrimination abridging the privi-
leges of a citizen of the United States. The decision was
strongly protested, for prior to Colgate v. Harvey the priv-
ileges of national citizenship had been held to embrace
only purely federal relations: the right to hold national
office; to participate in elections therefor; to petition the
Congress; importation privileges; and so on.55
With Madden v. Kentucky56 the expansion was punc-
tured, expressly and firmly. The question was the consti-
tutionality of a Kentucky statute which imposed on Ken-
51b Id. 107.
"8 Supra n. 22.
1 BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd Ed. 1910) 640; WILLOUGHBY, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (2nd Ed. 1929) See. 137; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S.
377, 382, 38 L. Ed. 485, 14 S. Ct. 570 (1893) ; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S.
525, 537-538, 63 L. Ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2 (1919).
6' 296 U. S. 404, 80 L. Ed. 299, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935).
55 See supra n. 53.
50309 U. S. 83. 84 L. Ed. 406, 60 S. Ct. 406 (1940).
[VOL. V
OUTSIDE SALESMEN
tucky citizens a tax on bank deposits outside the state of
.005 % and on bank deposits within the state a tax of .001%.
The statute was upheld. Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for
the court, saying:
"There is no occasion to attempt again an exposi-
tion of the views of this Court as to the proper limita-
tions of the privileges and immunities clause [in the
Fourteenth Amendment]. There is a very recent dis-
cussion in Hague v. C. I. 0. The appellant purports
to accept as sound the position stated as the view of
all the justices concurring in the Hague decision. This
position is that the privileges and immunities clause
[in the Fourteenth Amendment] protects all citizens
against abridgement by states of rights of national
citizenship as distinct from the fundamental or natural
rights inherent in state citizenship. . . . In applying
this constitutional principle this Court has determined
that the right to operate an independent slaughter-
house, to sell wine on terms of equality with grape
growers, and to operate businesses free of state regu-
lation were not privileges and immunities protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . We think it quite
clear that the right to carry out an incident to a trade,
business or calling, such as the deposit of money in
banks, is not a privilege of national citizenship." 7
The plain conclusion is that the particular privilege
involved in the case at hand-workmen's compensation as
an incident to a trade-is not within the interstate privi-
leges clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Effect of the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment.
On this there may be as considerable argument as there
is adjudication. There is, on the one hand, the general
formula of Barbier v. Connolly, a decision upholding a
municipal ordinance regulating public laundries:
"The Fourteenth Amendment . .. undoubtedly in-
tended not only that there should be no arbitrary
deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of
-7 Id. 309 U. S. 83, 90-92.
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property, but that equal protection and security should
be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoy-
ment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons
should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness
and acquire and enjoy property; that they should have
like access to the courts of the country for the pro-
tection of their persons and property, the prevention
and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of con-
tracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the
pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pur-
suits by others under like circumstances; that no
greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid
upon others in the same calling and condition. .... 
On the other hand, Maxwell v. Bugbee ruled that a state
tax which applied to local property the rate which would
be applicable to the entire estate were it all within the
borders of the state was constitutional:
"Equal protection of the laws requires equal opera-
tion of the laws upon all persons in like circumstances.
... In making classification, which has been uni-
formly held to be within the power of the State, in-
equalities necessarily arise, for some classes are
reached, and others omitted, but this has never been
held to render such statutes unconstitutional." 9
A more specific test was enunciated in a decision deal-
ing with a statute prescribing the width of bituminous coal
mine entries. The test, said the Court, is whether "there
is no fair reason for the law that would not require with
equal force its extension to others whom it leaves un-
touched."6
That test in the case at hand constrains a conclusion
that the Outside Salesman Statute-if construed literally-
runs afoul of the equal protection of the laws clause. Of
course, to adopt that test without more ado would be
superficial glibness. Where there are rational grounds for
r' Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31-2, 28 L. Ed. 923, 5 S. Ct. 357
(1885).
60Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 541, 63 L. Ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2
(1919).




discriminations "persons or their properties may be
grouped into classes to each of which specific legal rights
or liabilities may be attached."6' 1 The tenor of the equal
protection doctrine today revolves around that simple but
broad statement. Classifications based on reasonable
grounds, on differences which bear a "just and proper"
relation to the classification are valid.2 Really, however,
there is no necessity to poke and pry further into this
amorphous realm of constitutional interpretation. The
purpose of this venture, that of unfolding the case at hand
and tying its ramifications into the Maryland law, has been
accomplished.
CONCLUSION.
In this sort of analysis, conclusions are often dangerous.
In the effort to produce a neatly trimmed and tied packet
what has been only suggested may become flat statement.
With that in mind it can be nonetheless stated that the
Goslin case, important as it is, must be recognized as deal-
ing with but one of eight possible similar litigation-situa-
tions under the Outside Salesman Statute. The remaining
seven stand on their own bottoms and require reasoning,
not mechanical compression into the Goslin category. The
reasoning that harmonizes all is that where the injury
occurs beyond Maryland the salesman must be a citizen
or resident employed under a contract made in Maryland
if he is to receive compensation; where the injury occurs
in Maryland, residence and place of contract are imma-
terial, are not legally operative facts. It can almost be
stated that workmen's compensation, as an important part
of the pursuit of a trade or business, falls within the privi-
leges and immunities of the citizens of the several states.
Whether the operation of the Comity Clause on statutes
conflicting with it is to extend, automatically and without
regard to the intent of the statute, those privileges so as
to level any inequality, is a hard nut to crack. In the case
at hand it should be noted that these constitutional ques-
6' WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2nd Ed. 1929) Sec. 1273.
61 Gulf Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 165, 41 L. Ed. 666, 17 S. Ct. 255
(1897).
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tions arise only after the main position has been disre-
garded; that if the statute be construed as offered herein
these constitutional queries disappear.
The determination of that constitutional issue cannot
be made on the legal level. The argument of the Quong
Ham Wah case, allowed to pass through the Supreme Court,
is as valid, legally, as any argument in opposition, legally.
What effect, practically, and what good-or bad-so-
cially, would that doctrine have on our commercial and
civil life is the proper resolution of the problem. This
imports no nonsense, either transcendental or functional,
into the law; where there are competing doctrines, that one
should be accepted which demonstrates its worth.
On that, a study more exacting than this venture, which
sought only to explain the issues, is needed.
